We show how an online advertising network can use filtering, predictive pricing and revenue sharing together to manage the quality of cost-per-click (CPC) traffic. Our results suggest that predictive pricing alone can and should be used instead of filtering to manage organic traffic quality, whereas either method can be used to deter click inflation.
INTRODUCTION
Advertisers have been moving online in increasing numbers over the past decade. The online medium has gained popularity because it can potentially reach a very targeted audience, often at a lower cost than print or broadcast media, yielding a higher return on investment (ROI).
In any advertising medium, advertisers will be willing to pay more for higher-quality traffic. Here, "quality" is measured by the likelihood that a "visitor" (i.e., viewer, listener, reader or web surfer, depending on the medium) will eventually be acquired as a "customer" of the service being advertised (e.g., buying a product, making a campaign contribution, or signing up for a mailing list). And as in traditional media, online traffic quality can vary greatly depending on the channel (in the online context, a "channel" is simply a website from which traffic originates).
Broadly speaking, there are three techniques that online advertising networks can use to influence the quality of traffic (i.e., impressions and click-throughs) on their network: filtering, predictive pricing and revenue sharing. Filtering refers to distinguishing between valid and invalid traffic. Examples of invalid traffic include unintentional click-throughs, web-crawler traffic and fraudulent traffic. The implication is that the advertiser will not be billed (and the publisher will not be paid) for traffic that is deemed invalid. Predictive pricing [12] is concerned with a different aspect of traffic
Motivation: A Lemons Market
Managing traffic quality is a problem of immense practical significance because the CPC market has the two signature characteristics of a "lemons market" [2] : asymmetric information (publishers know more about their audience that an advertiser does, and can engage in click fraud) and products (i.e., clicks) of varying quality. Without a reputable, longlived intermediary to counteract an advertiser's uncertainty about traffic quality, the market may collapse: high-quality publishers would not receive fair value for their traffic, and advertisers get saddled with mostly low-quality traffic.
Advertising networks act as this intermediary, by pricing traffic differently based on quality. For a network to remain in business, it must deliver sufficiently high-quality traffic to advertisers. If substantially higher quality is offered by a competing network, advertisers would probably switch. So, although filtering, predictive pricing and revenue sharing can help advertising networks attract and retain lucrative traffic, applying these tools suboptimally can mean that a network is "leaving money on the table". In a market that, by most estimates, is worth several billions of dollars, losses due to a suboptimal policy can be tremendous.
As we alluded to earlier, there are two distinct-but-related aspects of traffic quality: validity and targetedness. Validity refers to whether a click is valid or invalid. Valid clicks have a strictly positive probability of becoming a conversion, whereas invalid clicks have zero probability. Targetedness refers to the likelihood that a valid click will become a conversion. Targetedness is measured by the conversion rate, defined in Section 2.
Most existing research on traffic quality is concerned with validity, and click fraud in particular (e.g., [5, 6, 10, 13] ).
There has also been much discussion of traffic quality in the media and online forums, mostly centered on click fraud [15, 16, 17, 18] . However, traffic quality involves more than just validity, and validity is a broader issue than just click fraud. Relatively little attention has been paid to the targetedness aspect of traffic quality. To the authors' knowledge, our earlier work [12] is the only published study to date on predictive pricing as a tool to manage targetedness. However, in [12] , targetedness is considered independently i.e., it is assumed that all traffic is valid. In this paper, filtering, predictive pricing and revenue sharing are all used together to shape the quality of CPC traffic flowing through an online advertising network.
Overview
We begin by presenting an economic model of the CPC advertising market (Sections 2.1 and 2.2). Our intent is to hone in on the decisions that affect traffic quality. Although our focus is on CPC, an analogous model can be developed for the cost-per-mille (CPM) and cost-per-action (CPA) pricing schemes. We provide an expression for an advertising network's best-response (Section 2.3). That is, if a network knows the filtering, predictive pricing and revenue sharing policies of its competitors, what policy should the network choose in response?
We then study the properties of this best-response function, as they relate to the management of traffic quality. Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
• Due to the underlying incentives, it is important to distinguish between the two sources of click traffic: organic traffic and publisher-initiated click inflation. All valid traffic is organic, by definition, although organic traffic can also be invalid. All click inflation is, by definition, invalid (it is a form of click fraud).
• To manage the quality of organic traffic, it is unnecessary (and, in some cases, suboptimal) to use both predictive pricing and filtering simultaneously. Predictive pricing alone is enough. (Section 3)
• Filtering can, however, be (indirectly) useful in fighting click inflation, as long as the performance of the filtering algorithm can be accurately characterized. Otherwise, predictive pricing can be used to fight click inflation. (Sections 4.2 and 4.3)
CPC ADVERTISING
We model the CPC market as a one-shot dynamic game between three classes of players: content publishers, advertising networks and advertisers. Content publishers (or, publishers) publish websites and display advertisements alongside their content. Advertisers design advertisements (or, ads) and bid at auction on keywords that best describe the interests of their target market. Advertising networks (or, networks) act as intermediaries between publishers and advertisers, by first judging which keywords best describe each publisher's content, and then delivering ads to the publisher from advertisers that have bid on those keywords.
If a user visits a publisher's site and clicks on an ad related to a given keyword, we say that a click-through (or, click) has occurred on that ad. If the click is deemed valid by the network, the advertiser pays the network a small amount. The network then pays out a fraction of this amount to the publisher where the click originated. Filtering is the process of detecting invalid clicks. Predictive pricing affects how much the advertiser is billed by the network. The revenue share determines what fraction of this billed amount the network will pay out to the publisher. A small fraction of valid clicks become conversions for the advertiser e.g., a product purchase, or a sign-up to an e-mail list. The advertiser earns some revenue each time a click becomes a conversion. Table 1 is a summary of the notation used in this paper. Consider a single keyword. Suppose there are I publishers whose content is relevant to the keyword, K advertisers interested in buying clicks on this keyword, and J networks. Typically, I K J. Traffic. Each publisher i receives Vi clicks on his website, of which only a fraction ri are valid. That is, publisher i receives riVi valid clicks and (1 − ri)Vi invalid clicks in total. For now, we assume that ri and Vi are fixed parameters that describe the validity of publisher i's traffic (we will relax this assumption in Section 4, when we discuss click inflation).
Notation
In our model, each publisher i decides how to allocate its volume, Vi, of clicks across the J networks. Note that in practice, publishers allocate ad impressions (or, "page views"), rather than clicks. Under some reasonable assumptions (see [13] for a discussion), however, it is equivalent to model clicks (rather than impressions) as the objects being bought and sold. Let cij be the fraction of publisher i's clicks that are sent to network j. Then, Vicij is the total number of clicks that publisher i sends network j, of which riVicij (1) are valid clicks.
Filtering. The algorithms used by networks to filter out invalid clicks are prone to error. In particular, the algorithms may produce false positives ("Type I" errors) by marking valid clicks invalid. They may also produce false negatives ("Type II" errors) by marking invalid clicks valid.
Let uj be the fraction of valid clicks that network j's filtering algorithm correctly identifies as valid (i.e., true negatives). We assume in our model that fj(uj) ≡ u γ j j will be the fraction of invalid clicks that network j mistakenly marks valid (i.e., false negatives), where γj ∈ [1, ∞). The function fj reasonably approximates the relationship between the true-negative rate and false-negative rate in many realworld binary-decision tasks. For example, fj corresponds to a concave receiver operating characteristic, or "ROC curve". The fraction uj is a measure of how aggressively network j is filtering for invalid clicks (lower uj means more aggressive). The parameter γj is a measure how effective network j is at filtering (higher γj means more effective, since it leads to fewer false negatives for a given uj).
Of all the clicks that publisher i sends to network j,
is the fraction that is marked valid. Thus,
NijVicij
is the number of publisher i's clicks that network j marks valid. Marking a click invalid only means that the network will not charge the advertiser for the click, and will consequently not pay the publisher. The user is forwarded to the advertiser's site, irrespective of whether the click is marked valid or invalid. Predictive Pricing and Revenue Sharing. For each click coming from publisher i that is marked valid, network j bills advertisers for only a fraction gij of a click i.e., advertisers receive a (1 − gij) discount. The fraction gij is the predictive price that network j applies to publisher i's traffic. The effective number of clicks for which network j pays publisher i is then:
Suppose θj is the expected auction revenue per click on network j. Of each dollar of revenue from advertisers, network j pays out a fraction hj to publishers. The fraction hj is referred to as the revenue share. Then, the total revenue to publisher i from network j is:
Let gj ≡ {gij ∀i}. We refer to the pair (gj, hj) together as network j's pricing policy. We refer to the triple (uj, gj, hj) together as network j's traffic policy.
Conversion Rates. The clicks sent by the publishers to the networks are, in turn, distributed amongst the K advertisers (in proportions related to the advertisers' bids). Of all the clicks sent from publisher i to advertiser k via network j, let β ijk be the fraction that become conversions.
The fraction β ijk is referred to as a conversion rate. From each conversion, advertiser k earns an amount y k .
We assume that conversion rates are separable i.e., that each β ijk is a product of three factors:
Each factor in (6) has a different interpretation. β 
Sequence of Events
Our one-shot dynamic game is comprised of two stages:
1. In the first stage, each network j selects and announces its traffic policy (i.e., its filtering aggressiveness, uj, predictive prices, gj, and revenue share, hj).
2. In the second stage (or, the subgame), each publisher i decides which networks to sell its clicks on (i.e., its allocations, {cij ∀j}). Simultaneously, each advertiser k decides how much it is willing to pay for clicks from each network j (i.e., its valuations, {v kj ∀j}).
All players aim to maximize revenues. After the second stage, payoffs are realized: a) publishers sell clicks (i.e., display ads) on their chosen networks, b) networks mark a subset of these clicks valid, c) advertisers pay the networks (possibly a discounted price) for the clicks marked valid, and d) networks pay out a fraction of earned revenues to publishers. Recall that users are forwarded to the advertiser's site even if a click is marked invalid.
Best-Response Traffic Policy
We can now give an expression for the best-response traffic policy of network 1, holding the policies of all other networks fixed, and assuming equilibrium in the second stage. Define:
Xij is simply the revenue publisher i would earn if it sent all its traffic to network j (see (5)). Then, define Ai, the nominal number of conversions for publisher i, as follows:
The best-response traffic policy for network 1 can then be found as a solution to the following optimization problem:
The objective in (9) is an expression for network 1's profit. The first two constraints encode the assumption that each publisher chooses allocations optimally in the second stage. The third constraint (discussed below) implies that advertisers choose their valuations and bids optimally. Thus, the first three constraints together imply that there is an equilibrium in the second stage between publishers and advertisers. The next four constraints simply enforce the definitions given earlier (see (2), (4), (7) and (8)), while the final constraint gives ranges for the decision variables we are interested in.
The most striking feature of (9) is that the advertisers' valuations v kj do not appear anywhere. In fact, there are no k-subscripts at all. The fact that v kj does not appear greatly reduces the complexity of solving (9), since the number of decision variables is reduced by a factor K.
The advertisers' equilibrium behaviour (i.e., their private valuations and corresponding bids at auction) is captured implicitly in (9), via the constraint:
The derivation of (10) is non-trivial -we refer the reader to [12] for complete details. We will instead highlight the key intuitions here. We assume that each advertiser k chooses its private valuations, {v kj ∀j}, such that its total revenues from online advertising are maximized, subject to a lowerbound, R k , on its return on investment (ROI). Advertisers then strategically bid at auction for click-throughs on each network (without collusion). We also assume that each network j's auction mechanism is linear, in the sense that if all advertisers were to simultaneously scale their valuation by a factor δ (i.e., v kj ← δv kj ), then network j's expected auction revenue would also be scaled by δ (i.e., θj ← δθj).
Under just these (weak) assumptions, it is shown in [12] that the expected per-click auction revenue θj will be proportional to
, which (roughly speaking) is the ratio of converted clicks to billed-for clicks on network j. The proportionality constant κj can be computed from the distribution of advertiser types y k , R k , β Adv k ∀k , and the auction mechanism used by network j. In particular, κj does not depend on the actions of publishers or networks. In this sense, the constants {κj ∀j} act as sufficient statistics for the distribution of advertiser types, leading to (10) .
Seen in this light, the structure of the objective function in (9) is quite intuitive. In order for network 1 to maximize profits, it must simultaneously: a) attract a large volume of billable traffic from publishers (i.e., high i Ei1), b) deliver high-conversion-rate traffic to advertisers (i.e., high θ1), and c) retain a large share of revenues (i.e., low h1).
TrafficQuality
The optimization problem (9) is highly non-convex, making it difficult to even find feasible points. We derived an iterative algorithm, TrafficQuality, for finding approximate solutions to (9) . The key step is to solve a sequence of geometric programs, each of which is a relaxation of (9) . TrafficQuality is a generalization of the PricingPolicy algorithm derived in [12] , so we omit the details here.
In Section 3, we study the relationship between filtering and predictive pricing. Our findings will allow us to reduce the number of input parameters required to run TrafficQuality, and estimate the rest from readily observable data. However, in practice, the incentive for click inflation means that some of the observable data may be manipulated by the publishers. Section 4 is thus devoted to dealing with the incentive for click inflation.
Finally, TrafficQuality computes a best-response for network 1, given the policies of competing networks, and assuming an equilibrium is played in the second-stage. We refer the reader to Section 5 for a brief discussion of equilibria in the first-stage of our game.
FILTERING AND PREDICTIVE PRICING
In this Section, we study the relationship between filtering and predictive pricing. Given the option, should a network choose one over the other, or use both together?
The main result in [13] was that, if predictive pricing is disallowed and all networks offer the same revenue share, then it is optimal for network j to filter aggressively. In particular, if network 1 is the most skilled at filtering (i.e., γ1 > γj ∀j = 1), all publishers (even low-quality ones) will prefer to send their traffic to network 1, provided it is filtering aggressively enough (i.e., u1 ≤ u * for some known threshold value u * ). As a concrete example, consider a market with I = 20 publishers and J = 2 networks. Both networks offer publishers a revenue share of h1 = h2 = 50% and set gij = 1 ∀i (i.e., no predictive pricing). The networks are equally skilled at selecting ads (β = 1), but network 1 is more skilled at filtering (γ1 = 10 and γ2 = 8). Network 2 is marking valid u2 = 80% of valid clicks (thus, it also marks valid u γ 2 2 = 17% of invalid clicks). To simulate a wide variation in traffic quality, we assume that ri = 0.05i and β Pub i = 0.0025i i.e., publishers are sorted in increasing order of traffic validity and targetedness, with ri ranging between 5% and 100%, and β Pub i ranging between 0.25% and 5% (a 5% conversion rate would be considered very high in practice).
For this scenario, we used TrafficQuality (with g1 and h1 disabled) to compute the best-response traffic policy for network 1. As predicted, TrafficQuality recommends that network 1 filter aggressively (i.e., send u1 → 0), causing all publishers (including the low-quality ones) to send their traffic to network 1 (in this example, u1 ≤ u * = 81% was sufficient for network 1 to win over the market). Now, consider the same scenario, except that network 1 is allowed to use predictive pricing. That is, we allow g1 to be a decision variable for network 1 (note that the revenue share, h1, is still fixed at 50%). Using TrafficQuality with g1 enabled this time, we get a very interesting outcome: the optimum is now u1 = 100%. That is, TrafficQuality is recommending that network 1 stop filtering altogether, and just use predictive pricing instead. Figure 1 shows the effective number of clicks, Ei1, that each publisher is paid for (as a fraction of Vici1), with and without predictive pricing (see (4) ). With filtering alone, network 1 is restricted to a linear Ei1 profile (recall that Ni1 is linear in ri, and in this example ri is linear in i), and all publishers choose to send traffic to network 1. With both filtering and predictive pricing enabled, TrafficQuality outputs a non-linear profile of predictive prices that achieves exactly the same market outcome as the filtering-only case (i.e., all publishers choose network 1), but it does so without needing to using filtering at all.
This outcome is not peculiar to the scenario described above -it is actually a general phenomenon: Proof. In (9), uj only appears in the fourth constraint (i.e., the definition of Nij), and in turn Nij only appears in the product Nijgij. Also, note that if uj = 1, then Nij = 1 irrespective of ri (i.e., all clicks are being marked valid).
Therefore, if (ũ1,g1, h * 1 ) is feasible for (9), then (1, g * 1 , h * 1 ) will also be feasible, where g * i1 =gi1Ñi1 andÑi1 =ũ1ri + u γ 1 1 (1−ri). Moreover, all other variables are left unchanged. Neither Nij nor gij appear in the objective of (9). Therefore, if (ũ1,g1, h * 1 ) is optimal, then (1, g * 1 , h * 1 ) will also be optimal. Conversely, suppose (1, g * 1 , h * 1 ) is a solution to (9) , and let uj < 1. If there is an i such that ri < 1 and
> 1, which is infeasible. Therefore, an optimal (ũ1,g1, h * 1 ) whereũj < 1 does not necessarily exist.
Theorem 1 says that there is always a best-response for network 1 (i.e., a solution to (9) ) that involves using predictive pricing alone (i.e., setting uj = 1). Therefore, in most settings, predictive pricing can and should be used for managing traffic quality instead of filtering.
Theorem 1 holds irrespective of the numbers of publishers and advertisers and their traffic qualities. An immediate implication is that a network seemingly gains no competitive advantage from having superior algorithms for filtering, since competing networks can simply respond by implementing predictive pricing. This conclusion is a partial contradiction of the result established in [13] .
Whereas filtering effectively requires careful development of algorithms for detecting specific traffic patterns, predictive pricing only requires aggregate measurements of clickand acquisition traffic and the selection of a set of coefficients (i.e., predictive prices). Of course, the challenge in predictive pricing is being able to accurately estimate these required traffic statistics (more on this issue in Section 3.2).
Combining Theorem 1 with the result from [13] , we can also deduce the following: Corollary 1. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, each network uses either filtering or predictive pricing, but not both.
Proof. In equilibrium, each network uses a best-response traffic policy. From Theorem 1, if a network uses predictive pricing, it is best not to filter. From Theorem 2 in [13] , if a network is not predictive pricing, its best response is to filter aggressively.
Practical Implications
Theorem 1 may not seem very surprising, since predictive pricing does allow for much finer-grained publisher-level control (i.e., a factor gij for each publisher i) compared to filtering, which provides a single control uj for the entire population of publishers. However, Theorem 1 has very significant practical implications.
No need to measure or control uj
In most practical settings, uj, the true-negative rate (i.e., aggressiveness) of network j's filtering algorithm, is difficult to measure since such a measurement typically requires a "ground truth" data set, which may not be available. In our context, ground truth would be a "representative" sample of traffic where clicks are labelled valid and invalid. Even if uj could be measured, network j may not be able to select arbitrary values for uj strictly between 0 and 1.
On the other hand, it is always possible to set uj = 0 or uj = 1 by simply marking all clicks invalid or valid, respectively (of course, with uj = 1, the false-negative rate u γ j j would also be 1 i.e., all invalid clicks would also be marked valid). Theorem 1 guarantees that there is always a bestresponse where uj = 1.
No need to know ri and β

Pub i
Even if accurate measurement and control of uj were possible, there is a more serious practical issue concerning parameter estimation. In order for a network to use TrafficQuality to find an optimal traffic policy, it needs to know of ri and β
for each publisher i (see (9) ). However, in practice, these quantities are not observed -if ri could be observed, filtering would be unnecessary! Typically, networks are only able to measure the volume of clicks (e.g., using click logs) and numbers of conversions (e.g., using conversion tracking code installed on the advertisers' sites).
Fortunately, Theorem 1 allows a network to run TrafficQuality even without knowing ri and β Pub i . We know that it is sufficient for network 1 to search for a traffic policy where uj = 1. From (2), setting uj = 1 implies that Nij = 1 ∀i, irrespective of ri and γj. Upon substituting uj = Nij = 1 into fourth constraint of (9), we observe that the only other place that ri or β instead. Theorem 1 guarantees that there is no loss in profits from calculating a best response in this way.
Parameter Estimation
We now demonstrate how network j can estimate the product riβ Pub i for each publisher i, as well as other parameters required to run TrafficQuality, using data that can be readily observed in practice.
Estimating riβ
Pub i Suppose a user visits publisher i's website, on which advertiser k's ad is displayed, and the ad is delivered by network j. If the user then clicks on the ad, network j redirects the user from publisher i's site to advertiser k's site, and records the click-through in its click logs. So, by simply analysing its click logs, network j can compute Vicij ∀i, which is the total number of clicks sent to network j by publisher i. Network j can also compute ξ ijk ∀(i, k), where ξ ijk is the fraction of publisher i's traffic sent to advertiser k by network j.
Let A ijk denote the number of clicks originating on publisher i's site that eventually become conversions for advertiser k, where the ad is delivered by network j (the letter A stands for "actions" or "acquisitions"). Conversion tracking software installed on the advertiser's site typically gives the total number of clicks that advertiser k converts, along with the times and dates of those clicks and conversions (alternatively, the advertiser can "self-report" the number of conversions, although the advertiser may not self-report truthfully -see [11] and [14] for a discussion). Cross-referencing this data with the click logs, a network can infer which publisher each converted click originated from. Thus, as long as the required conversion-tracking infrastructure is in place, each network j can observe A ijk ∀(i, k).
Using the quantities defined in Section 2, A ijk can be decomposed into a product as follows:
Equation (11) holds since Vicijriξ ijk is the number of valid clicks sent from publisher i to advertiser k via network j, and β ijk is the fraction of these clicks that become conversions. Therefore, using its observations of Vicij, ξ ijk and A ijk , network j can compute the product riβ ijk ∀(i, k) as follows:
Then, applying the separability assumption (6), we get:
Observe that the right-hand side of (13) can be computed directly from available data for every (i, k), whereas the lefthand side is comprised of parameters which network j needs to estimate. In particular, network j has IK (possibly noisy) data points with which to estimate the I + K parameters {riβ Pub i ∀i} and {β Adv k ∀k}. Since there will typically be many more data points than parameters (i.e., IK I + K), a data-fitting technique (e.g., least-squares) can be used to to do the estimation.
In practice, some advertisers may not be willing to install conversion tracking software on their sites. However, network j is most interested in estimating the product riβ Pub i (for use in TrafficQuality), as opposed to β Adv k for specific k. So, as long as "enough" advertisers do install conversion tracking software, data-fitting techniques can be used to compute good estimates of riβ . Real-world deviations from, say, the separability assumption can also be (partially) compensated-for using fitting techniques.
Other parameters
In many cases, network j can assume Vi = Vicij whenever publisher i sends it any traffic at all (i.e., that cij = 1 whenever cij > 0). Publisher i's optimization problem (not discussed here) is such that, in most cases, its optimal allocation cij will be either 0 or 1. That is, if publisher i sends network j any traffic at all, it will send network j all of its traffic. Fractional allocations of traffic across multiple networks (i.e., cij ∈ (0, 1)) are only optimal for publisher i when there a "tie" between those networks in terms of profitability, which happens infrequently in practice.
In such cases, network j can use (13) to also infer Ai, the nominal number of conversions for publisher i, as follows:
Intuitively, Ai measures the "potential" number of conversions that can result from publisher i's traffic, before adjusting for the matching algorithms of network j (i.e., β Finally, we assume in (13) and (14) 
CLICK INFLATION
Theorem 1 states that, for most sources of traffic, predictive pricing can and should be used for managing traffic quality instead of filtering. In fact, there are cases where filtering gives lower profits. However, Theorem 1 paints an incomplete picture. An underlying assumption in the proof was that ri and Vi are fixed parameters that describe publisher i's traffic. In particular, they were not considered decision variables for publisher i. Stated differently, we assumed that all of the traffic on publisher i's site is organic, in the sense that the traffic is not generated or caused by the publisher itself. All valid traffic, by definition, is organic. Most forms of invalid traffic can also be considered organic, including the various forms of non-click-fraud invalid traffic (e.g., double-clicks, unintentional clicks, web crawlers), as well as click fraud due to "competitor clicking" [4] .
Unfortunately, ri and Vi can indeed be manipulated by publisher i in practice. In particular, a publisher can inject a stream of fraudulent clicks into the traffic it sends to network j -this practice is known as click inflation [4] . Engaging in click inflation increases the total volume of clicks while leaving the amount of valid clicks and the number of resulting conversions unchanged (since none of the fraudulent clicks become conversions).
In Section 4.1, we discuss why click inflation might occur, and how to account for it in our model. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we present a pair of approaches that networks can use to compensate for click inflation. Roughly, one approach is to use filtering to estimate ri, and then pay publisher i for its valid, organic traffic only. Another is to find predictive prices such that the incentive for click inflation is eliminated altogether. In Section 4.4, we compare these approaches.
Why Click Inflation Occurs
It is easy to see why publishers might have an incentive to engage in click inflation. Define, for convenience, Gi ≡ riVi and Bi ≡ (1 − ri)Vi (the letters G and B stand for "good" and "bad"). Click inflation causes Bi to increase without a change in Gi. For example, publisher i might pay users to visit its site and click on ads, even though the users are uninterested in the product being advertised. The problem for network j is that it pays for NijVicij = ujGi + u γ j j Bi cij clicks, so for any uj > 0, the number of clicks that publisher i is paid for will be increasing in Bi.
As an illustration, we computed the best-response traffic policy for network 1 in a scenario where ri = 1 ∀i (i.e., Gi = Vi) and β Pub i is linear in i. We then chose the highest-quality publisher, and computed by how much its revenues would increase if it inflated its click volume by various amounts. The results are shown in Figure 2 . For example, inflating click volumes by 11.5% (i.e., injecting Bi = 0.115Gi fraudulent clicks) results in a 19.6% increase in revenues.
There are two features that stand out in Figure 2 . First, publishers can increase their revenues significantly by generating fraudulent traffic. Second, it not optimal for a publishers to generate an arbitrarily large amount of fraudulent traffic. In our example, the publisher's revenues are maximized (a gain of 41%) when it inflates its traffic by just 34%. Any further inflation causes its revenues to decrease, since network 1 would apply a very low predictive price to its traffic. Intuitively, this example suggests that even high-quality publishers may try to slip a small amount of fraudulent traffic through the networks' filters.
To model click inflation, we slightly modify the dynamic game described in Section 2.2 as follows:
• In the first stage, networks select traffic policies based on forecasts of organic traffic quality.
• In the second stage, publishers decide on allocations as well as whether (and by how much) to inflate Bi.
• After the second stage (i.e., after receiving the publishers' traffic, but before any payments are made), networks adjust their traffic policies to account for any perceived click inflation in each publisher's traffic.
In other words, ri and Vi are treated as decision variables for publisher i. Recall that click inflation causes an increase in total volume Vi, but leaves Gi unchanged. In Section 2, the fixed set of parameters that described publisher i's traffic (i.e., its "type") was the triple (ri, β Pub i , Vi). In this Section, publisher i's organic traffic is described by (Gi, β Pub i , Ai).
Solution 1: Estimate ri
One approach for network j to fight click inflation is to somehow estimate ri, so that publisher i is (effectively) paid for only riVicij = Gicij valid clicks. For example, one possible way to derive an estimate of ri is to: a) run the clicks through a filtering algorithm to observe Nij, b) use labeled "synthetic" traffic to measure uj and γj, and then c) use Nij, uj and γj to invert (2) .
We note here that accurately estimating ri is not the same as accurately distinguishing between valid and invalid clicks (i.e., filtering). The latter involves making accurate decisions on a click-by-click basis, whereas the former requires deriving only a single aggregate estimate. In this Section, rather than detailing an estimation procedure, we study the effect of estimation errors on a network's profits (since network j's estimation procedure may be highly dependent on the specifics of its ad-serving mechanism).
As described in Section 4.1, the incentive for click inflation arises because network j usually pays each publisher i for NijVicij = ujGi + u γ j j Bi cij clicks. The expression for Nij captures the fact that ri is unknown to network j, and that its filtering algorithms are prone to error. Hypothetically, suppose network j knew the exact value of ri. It could then simply set Nij = ri ∀(i, j) i.e., pay each publisher i for exactly riVicij clicks. Then, (4) would be Eij = Gigijcij, which is independent of Bi, implying that publisher i would gain nothing from engaging in click inflation. Operationally, network j would then compute its bestresponse traffic policy by simply replacing the fourth constraint in (9) with:
With this motivation in mind, network j can try to estimate ri for each publisher i. The extent to which network j can deter click inflation will depend on how accurately it can estimate ri. Inaccurate estimates mean that network j solves (9) with incorrect coefficients, and so the policy output by TrafficQuality may be suboptimal. We ran an experiment to quantify the sensitivity of network 1's profits to errors in estimating ri. For concreteness, suppose network 1 uses filtering to derive a noisy estimate,ri, of ri for each publisher i:
Each Zi is an independent, zero-mean, unit-variance normal random variable (ri is truncated so that it is between 0 and 1). Smaller (larger) values of the standard error, σ, mean that network 1 is more (less) accurate at estimating ri. The value of σ was varied between 0% and 40%, and several trials were run at each value. In each trial, network 1 first uses filtering to derive a set of estimates {ri ∀i} (the estimation error is given by (16)). Network 1 then sets Nij =ri in (9) , and uses TrafficQuality to compute a best-response pricing policy (ĝ1,ĥ1). Of course, (ĝ1,ĥ1) may be suboptimal sinceri = ri (although riβ Pub i can still be estimated accurately, as discussed in Section 3.2). Network 1 assumes that network 2 is setting gi2 ∝ riβ . We then compute the actual profit to network 1 resulting from using (ĝ1,ĥ1) and Nij =ri. When computing actual profits, network 2 is assumed to know ri and β Pub i exactly. Figure 3 shows network 1's profits in each trial, as well as the average profit across the trials for each value of σ. Profits have been normalized by network 1's profit in the σ = 0% case. As expected, from Figure 3 we see that lower values of σ (i.e., higher estimation accuracy) result in higher profits for network 1. For σ ≤ 10%, the losses are relatively small (less than 10% loss in some trials). For σ > 10%, however, the variance in the outcome increases greatly, due to estimation errors. The average losses also steadily increase, exceeding 60% at σ = 30%. We conclude, in this example, that the estimatesri are useful only when σ ≤ 10% or so. There is one more issue: in practice, networks can only refuse to pay publishers for clicks that their algorithm marks invalid. That is, networks cannot refuse payment for a given click-through, without providing the publisher a justification for doing so. To utilize its estimates of ri, network j would take the following steps:
1. Use filtering to derive estimatesri, but mark all clicks valid irrespective of what the filter decides.
2. Use TrafficQuality with Nij ←ri to compute predictive prices g * j and revenue share hj. Effectively, network j is computing a pricing policy for a setting where all clicks are valid.
3. Apply gij ← g * ijri to each publisher i's traffic. Observe that network j does not actually mark any clicks invalid. The desired effect of paying for only Gicij clicks is achieved indirectly using predictive prices gij = g * ijri .
To summarize, if network j could determine ri exactly, it would use TrafficQuality with Nij ← ri to compute its traffic policy. There is zero loss in network j's profits due to click inflation since no new restrictions are placed on gj (compare this situation to Section 4.3). Therefore, when fighting click inflation using estimatesri of ri, any and all losses are purely due to inaccurate estimates.
Solution 2: Quasi-CPA
An alternate approach to fighting click inflation is to directly constrain the search for predictive prices in a way that eliminates the incentive, as we describe in this Section. The main advantage of doing so is that no estimates of ri are needed. As we will demonstrate, this approach is closely related to cost-per-action (CPA) pricing schemes. It is widely agreed-upon that CPA schemes are resistant to click inflation. They are susceptible to other forms of fraud, however -we refer the reader to [4, 11, 14] for more details.
Suppose network j simply assumes that all clicks are valid i.e., that ri = 1 ∀i. The only other measure of publisher quality would then be the conversion rate, β , since ri ∈ [0, 1]. Let us assume in this Section that the publishers are sorted byβi (i.e.,βi is increasing in i).
We can interpret a vector of predictive prices gj as samples of a continuous function gj(β). More specifically, gj is simply the continuous function gj(β) sampled at the I points {βi, i ∈ 1, . . . , I}. These I points could then be interpolated smoothly to reconstruct the function gj(β) over the domain [0, 1] . Figure 1 in Section 3 is an example.
Let uj = 1 (due to Theorem 1), and define eij ≡ cijhjθj for convenience. Interpreting gij as the function gj(β) evaluated at the pointβi, we can then rewrite (5) as follows:
Recall that πij is the revenue earned by publisher i from traffic sent to network j. To simplify our discussion, let us assume in this Section that β by just counting up the number of conversions, Ai, and dividing by the volume of clicks, Vi (see (8)). Therefore, we can write (17) as:
Clearly, the incentive for click inflation would be eliminated if πij were non-increasing in Bi. Since Vi = Gi + Bi andβi is inversely proportional to Vi, it is sufficient that πij is non-decreasing inβi. We can therefore differentiate (18) and impose a non-negativity condition:
Simplifying, we get:
To eliminate the incentive for click inflation, network j should select predictive prices gij such that (20) holds for allβi. Intuitively, a high-quality publisher i should not feel tempted to "masquerade" (i.e., by engaging in click inflation) as any other lower-quality publisher just because the latter is "getting a better deal" than the former. We can achieve this effect by approximating the derivative in (20) with a backward difference between publishers i and i − 1:
Simplifying again, we arrive at:
Therefore, we can simply add the constraint (22) to the optimization problem (9) , for each pair of publishers i and i − 1. It is very convenient that (22) can be added as-is to a geometric program (i.e., without using an approximation), meaning we can enforce these constraints exactly using the TrafficQuality algorithm. The constraint (22) has a very interesting form. At equality, it forces gij to be proportional toβi i.e., gij = δβi for some constant δ. Substituting gij = δβi into (4), and using (8), we find that the effective number of clicks for which network j pays publisher i is simply Eij = δcijAi. That is, Eij is directly proportional to the number of clicks that become conversions. We have, essentially, a CPA pricing scheme. It can even be shown that the expected revenues to each player in the market are equal to those that would be obtained from a CPA pricing scheme (we omit the details here). Therefore, what the constraint (22) tells us is that CPA is just a special case within the set of traffic policies that eliminate the incentive for click inflation. For this reason, we refer to traffic policies that enforce (22) as quasi-CPA policies.
Consider a scenario with I = 20 publishers and J = 2 networks. The fraction of valid traffic and the conversion rate for each publisher i is linear in i (ri = 0.05i and β Pub i = 0.0025i). This scenario is the same as the one considered in Figure 1 , except that we will now allow h1 to be a decision variable. Figure 4 is a plot of the productβi = riβ Pub i for each publisher i in this example -there are many lowquality publishers and relatively few high-quality publishers. Figure 5 shows the predictive prices that are recommended by TrafficQuality with and without the quasi-CPA constraint (22) included in the optimization problem (9) . For example, the predictive price chosen for publisher 15 in the quasi-CPA case is gij = 0.5625, compared to gij = 0.9843 for the unconstrained case. From Figures 4 and 5 , we see that the quasi-CPA constraint has yielded predictive prices that are (almost exactly) proportional toβi, whereas the unconstrained profile has a very different shape.
The unconstrained policy tries to dissuade low-quality publishers 1 through 7 by applying drastically lower predictive prices to them compared to medium-and high-quality publishers (8 through 20) . The quasi-CPA policy only allows network 1 to capture traffic from publishers 12 through 20 -the medium-quality publishers 8 through 11 are penalized too harshly due to (22), so they choose network 2 instead.
Comparison
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we presented two different approaches for removing the incentive for click inflation. Which approach should a network use?
The answer depends completely on how accurately the network is able to estimate ri. In the example in Section 4.3, network 1's profit using a quasi-CPA policy turns out to be 79% of the profit using the unconstrained policy (which could be used if there was no click inflation, or if ri could be estimated exactly). From the experiment in Section 4.2 (see Figure 3) , we see that average profits exceed 80% when the standard estimation error σ ≤ 10%. Therefore, in this instance, network 1 should use its estimates of ri if σ ≤ 10%. Otherwise, a quasi-CPA traffic policy should be used. In general, there will be a threshold value, say σ * , such that if σ ≤ σ * , estimating ri directly would be more profitable on average for network 1. The value of σ * , of course, would need to be identified by each network in practice.
DISCUSSION
Yahoo! and Google. There is anecdotal evidence that Yahoo! and Google employ predictive pricing profiles qualitatively similar to the unconstrained case in Figure 5 , i.e., a few low-quality publishers being punished severely, and the rest not even noticing the effects of predictive pricing. Just search online for "quality-based pricing" or "smart pricing", and read about publishers about "getting smart priced".
Relation to [13] and [12] . The model we presented in Section 2 is strictly more general than the models in [13] and [12] , so we have remained notationally consistent with these papers whenever possible. Fixing gij = 1 ∀(i, j) and hj = h ∀j (i.e., no predictive pricing and equal revenue shares), assuming β ijk = β ∀(i, j, k) (equal conversion rates) and treating uj as a decision variable places us in the setting of [13] . On the other hand, fixing uj = 1, assuming ri = 1 and treating gj and hj as decision variables gives us the model used in [12] . In this sense, TrafficQuality is a generalization of the PricingPolicy algorithm presented in [12] , since the optimization is done over the space of traffic policies (uj, gj, hj), rather than pricing policies (gj, hj).
In [13] , filtering aggressiveness was measured as the rate of false positives, xj i.e., the fraction of valid clicks that are mistakenly marked invalid. Thus, xj = 1 − uj.
Equilibria. The output of the TrafficQuality algorithm is a best-response traffic policy for a single network, assuming an equilibrium is played in the subgame. A natural question is, then, what about equilibria in the first stage? For example, is it possible to characterize the set of subgameperfect equilibria for our game?
Due to the richness of the networks' decision spaces in our game, general properties of subgame-perfect equilibria are difficult to derive. Corollary 1 in Section 3 is one of the few general statements we can make. Another partial answer is given in [13] , where it is shown that if no network uses predictive pricing, then in equilibrium all publishers and advertisers will flock to the network that is most skilled at filtering. However, with predictive pricing, such a "crisp" result does not hold. Many equilibria exist, and the structure is highly dependent on the players' types. In particular, in every equilibrium that we were able to compute (i.e., using TrafficQuality iteratively to find a fixed-point of the best-response functions), all networks received some positive share of the market (of course, this is a realistic outcome). A complete, analytical characterization would be a very interesting extension to our work.
Separability. We can derive an expression analogous to (9) by assuming a "weaker" form of separability, namely:
Here, {βij ∀(i, j)} would be a matrix of pairwise conversion rates. Separability as assumed in (6), however, is most useful when estimating parameters as described in Section 3.2. Using a weaker assumption would necessitate collecting more data in order to get accurate parameter estimates. An important follow-up to this paper would be an empirical test of how well conversion-rate separability approximates true market conditions. A related separability assumption is made in [1] and [19] , where the click-through rate for an impression is assumed to be the product of an advertiser-specific factor and a position/ŞslotŤ-specific factor, although empirical support has been mixed (e.g., [7] ).
Advantages of quasi-CPA over CPA. Since much of the online advertising industry (including some of the largest networks) currently operates on a CPC basis, there may be large costs and risks associated with switching to a CPA pricing scheme. Using a quasi-CPA traffic policy allows a network to reap the benefits of a CPA scheme (i.e., no click inflation) while maintaining a CPC infrastructure.
Another very important reason publishers and networks shy away from (and advertisers prefer) CPA schemes is that they transfer the risk of organic non-converting traffic entirely away from the advertisers (and on to publishers and networks). Using a CPC-based quasi-CPA policy enables a more equitable distribution of risk.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed how filtering, predictive pricing and revenue sharing can be used together to influence the quality of traffic delivered by a CPC advertising network. Managing traffic quality is critical, since quality uncertainty and asymmetric information between publishers and advertisers can destroy value (the "lemons market" effect).
We drew an important distinction between organic traffic and publisher-initiated click inflation. If possible, predictive pricing should be chosen in favour of filtering to manage organic traffic quality. To fight click inflation, either filtering or predictive pricing can used, depending on how well a network can characterize the performance of its filtering algorithm. In either case, it is important to remember that eliminating the incentive for click inflation does not mean that invalid traffic will disappear -many forms of invalid traffic are, in fact, organic.
